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Epistemology is concerned with the nature of knowledge, truth, and the justification of belief. 
Epistemology of religion considers these issues in relation to religious truth claims (e.g., whether 
or not it is reasonable to believe that God exists). Often, the epistemology of religion leads to 
inquiry into fundamental attitudes towards the criteria for justification. For example, a major 
strain of contemporary epistemology of religion has been characterized “as a debate over 
whether evidentialism applies to the belief component of faith, or whether we should instead 
adopt a more permissive epistemology.”1 Thus, whether or not evidentialism is the appropriate 
approach to epistemology comes into question. This question functions as the primary 
motivation for this paper. 
I will ultimately show some of the limitations of evidentialism and outline, why, on the 
basis of these limitations, it cannot be taken as a universal criteria for measuring the justification 
religious belief. That is, I will show that the evidentialist project fails insofar as it was an attempt 
to provide a universal criterion for justification that could be legitimately applied to any given 
religious belief in any circumstance. I will argue that evidentialism is limited like this because 
religious beliefs and their justification should not, indeed cannot, be legitimately separated from 
the worldview and presuppositions in which they are embedded. Rather, a more informed 
approach to epistemology of religion should take into account the important relationship that 
exists between worldviews and the justification of religious beliefs. Evidentialism fails because it 
does not provide a sufficiently flexible and nuanced criterion that can be legitimately applied 
across multiple worldviews. A corollary to this point is that it is appears to be impossible to find 
any such universal, trans-worldview criteria for measuring the justification of belief. 
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We will first consider the general lay of the land, as it were, in contemporary epistemology of 
religion. In the first place, this will involve an outline of the position known as Enlightenment 
evidentialism with its characteristic claim that because there is insufficient evidence that it is 
therefore unreasonable to believe in God. Next we will consider several responses to this thesis 
including the positions commonly referred to as Natural Theology, Wittgensteinian Fideism, and 
Reformed Epistemology. After this treatment of contemporary epistemology of religion I will 
then work out an alternative response to Enlightenment evidentialism. This response is loosely 
grounded in the Presuppositional school of Christian apologetics.
2
 In addition to formulating this 
response it will be helpful to compare and contrast it with the first three responses because there 
are a number overlapping concerns. The Presuppositional response to Enlightenment 
evidentialism is thus sympathetic to all three positions without out being ultimately reducible to 
any of them. Before closing we will consider several potential objections and problems with this 
view. In the end, this sort of response to Enlightenment evidentialism should provide many 
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 Apologetics is the theological discipline concerned, roughly, with defending the reasonableness of one’s faith or 
religious belief system. Presuppositionalism is one of several apologetic methods used by Christian apologists. The 
central thesis behind this method is that it is philosophically necessary and, more importantly, theologically 
necessary, to presuppose the truth of the Christian faith when defending its reasonableness. Presuppositionalists 
typically want to argue in a “broadly circular” manner that is consistent with this pre-established conclusion. While I 
do not have the space in this paper to fully present and defend Presuppositionalism, this paper can be understood as 
laying down at least some of the philosophical groundwork that this apologetic method is built upon. That is, this 
paper will illustrate at least one reason why, philosophically speaking, Presuppositionalists reject Enlightenment 
evidentialism. In the course of this paper I will address some of the problems with such a view. For instance, that 






Contemporary Epistemology of Religion 
Enlightenment Evidentialism 
As its name suggests, Enlightenment Evidentialism can be traced to several 18
th
 century 
Enlightenment thinkers. These thinkers include “…such notables as David Hume, Voltaire, 
Rousseau, and the towering Immanuel Kant.”3 A common theme in their work was to 
“…demand that all beliefs be subjected to the searching criticism of reason; if a belief cannot 
survive the scrutiny of reason, it is irrational.”4 Their concern for properly grounded and well-
formed beliefs was captured by Kant’s famous command, “Dare to know! (Sapere aude.) Have 
the courage to use your own understanding.”5 While many of the enlightenment thinkers were 
themselves theists, Enlightenment evidentialism represents a slightly later application of these 
basic concerns to religious belief with the resulting conclusion that religious belief, and 
especially belief in God, is unreasonable. 
One of the most famous and frequently cited expressions of this sort of Enlightenment 
evidentialism is W.K. Clifford’s 1877 essay “The Ethics of Belief”.6 This essay has had a lasting 
impact and it succinctly captures the core sentiment of evidentialism.
7
 In this essay, Clifford 
opens by telling a story about a hypothetical ship owner. The ship owner had very good reason 
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 Kelly James Clark, Return To Reason (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 3. For some specific examples of their 
work, see Hume’s essay On Miracles, section X of his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and also 
Book IV of John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 
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 Kelly James Clark, “Religious Epistemology”, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, eds. James Fieser and 
Bradley Dowden (2004). 
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 William .K. Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief,” Contemporary Review 29 (1877): 289-309. 
<http://www.uta.edu/philosophy/faculty/burgess-jackson/Clifford.pdf>. Clifford is not an Enlightenment thinker, 
per se, as he was writing in the late 19
th
 century. However, his work is representative of his predecessors’ 
sentiments. 
7





(i.e., very strong evidence) to believe that his ship needed some significant repairs. Rather than 
paying for these repairs he decided to suppress this knowledge. He decided to believe, contrary 
to the evidence, that the ship would survive the voyage. Clifford then gives two different endings 
to the story: 1) the ship sank and many lives were lost and 2) it made the voyage safely and no 
lives were lost. In both cases, regardless of the outcome, there was still something deeply wrong 
about what the ship owner has done. While the outcome was far worse on the first ending, both 
stories involve the ship owner believing a certain proposition whether or not “…he had a right to 
believe on such evidence as was before him.”8 Given that the ship owner was aware of what the 
evidence clearly suggested about the condition of his boat, it was wrong for him to believe 
anything to the contrary. The ship owner did not have the right to believe such a thing. In fact, he 
was obligated to believe the converse, namely, that the ship was not sound and the he should 
repair it soon. 
After this he introduces another story involving a group of people being slandered upon 
insufficient evidence.
9
 In this example it turns out that even a cursory glance at the readily 
available evidence would have proved that the allegations were not true. However the slanderers 
did not search for any evidence at all. They instead believed somewhat fanatically and upon 
insufficient grounds. He then adds further details that complicate the story. As it turns out, while 
the surface level evidence they ignored revealed innocence, a rigorous investigation would have 
revealed that the accused parties were in fact guilty after all. Thus the slanders ended up with an 
accidentally true belief formed by faulty and insufficient means. This works to illustrate the same 
point as the example of the ship owner: “…the question is not whether their belief was true or 
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 Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief”, 290. 
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false, but whether they entertained it on wrong grounds.”10 Thus, Clifford is primarily interested 
in this essay with the reasons that we have for believing as we do. 
It is important to note that on Clifford’s view there is a relationship between belief and 
obligation. One has an obligation to only believe upon the basis of sufficient evidence. 
Consequently, only when one has sufficient evidence do they have the corresponding right to 
believe something. Working behind all of this is his idea about the profoundly social nature of 
our beliefs. According to Clifford it is important for us to have properly formed beliefs (i.e., to 
only believe when we have the right to) because our beliefs always influence our actions in one 
way or another. Likewise our beliefs have many different ways of affecting those around us, the 
sorts of beliefs they hold, and by extension the sorts of actions they take. Thus society as a whole 
is influenced by one’s believing properly or improperly.11 For this reason he extends the need for 
evidence to virtually every kind of belief. There is a universal need for evidence-based beliefs: 
“To some up: it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon 
insufficient evidence.”12 Again at the end of the essay he says, “It is wrong in all cases to believe 
on insufficient evidence; and where it is presumption to doubt and to investigate, there it is worse 
than presumption to believe.”13  
One important implication to be drawn from this is that ensuring the justification of a 
given belief will require some measure of intentional, methodological inquiry into the subject 
matter at hand. Thus, because the ship owner and the slanderers from Clifford’s examples fail to 
perform their epistemic duties (i.e., fail to believe on the basis of the evidence), they are 
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 Ibid., 291. 
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 Ibid., 292. 
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 Ibid., 295. 
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therefore not justified in their beliefs. Likewise, if Smith wants to test the justificatory status of 
his belief B, what he needs to do is review all of the relevant evidence to see if B is grounded in 
sufficient evidence. If, because of the evidence, B is more likely true than false, then he can have 
some degree of confidence in believing it. However, he would not be justified in believing B 
with complete confidence unless there was indubitable evidence clearly demonstrating its truth.
14
 
Based on this we can classify Clifford’s evidentialism as a deontological theory of justification. 
Roughly speaking, deontological justification is the idea “…that being epistemically justified in 
believing something is bound up with, or to be analyzed in terms of, one's living up to one's 
intellectual duties or responsibilities.”15 
This raises a few questions. For instance, what exactly counts as evidence, how do we 
have access to it, and what does this mean for epistemology of religion in particular? Clifford 
does not address these questions in a systematic or highly detailed fashion. However, I think we 
can legitimately surmise from something he says in passing that firsthand experience is the best 
kind of evidence and that it should be relied upon as a final authority. While revealing his 
intention to discuss inference after discussing testimony, he says: “…and then, further [after 
discussing testimony], we shall inquire more generally when and why we may believe that which 
goes beyond our own experience, or even beyond the experience of mankind.”16 He seems here 
to be taking for granted that firsthand experience is the primary source of justificatory evidence. 
In a similar way, Peter Forrest identifies several sorts of evidence that are typically connected 
with evidentialism: 
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 Forrest, “Epistemology of Religion”. 
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 George Pappas, “Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification”, Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2013). 
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Here several sorts of evidence are allowed. One consists of beliefs in that which is 
“evident to the senses”, that is, beliefs directly due to sense-experience. Another sort of 
evidence is that which is “self-evident”, that is, obvious once you think about it. Evidence 
may also include the beliefs directly due to memory and introspection. Again moral 
convictions might count as evidence, even if not treated as “self-evident”.17 
 
Note that all of these involve some level of experience or other. Thus evidentialism functions 
primarily with reference to our firsthand experience and reflection on these experiences. 
 It is worth mentioning very briefly what Clifford thought of testimony and inference as 
they are related to evidence. Testimonial reports can only be counted as evidence when the 
testifier’s belief is richly embedded in sufficient evidence. Further, the recipient of the testimony 
must have at least some good reason for trusting the reporter. Or, in the very least, they cannot 
have any readily available reason for doubting them: “We may believe the statement of another 
person, when there is reasonable ground for supposing that he knows the matter of which he 
speaks, and that he is speaking the truth so far as he knows it.”18 Inference plays an equally 
important role. Just as many of our beliefs are formed on the basis of testimony so many of our 
beliefs involve inference at some level. For instance, my belief that the sun will rise tomorrow 
cannot be based upon firsthand experience because it is a belief about something in the future 
that has not yet come to pass. Thus I infer, based on past experiences, that the future will 
resemble the past and thus that the sun will rise. Clifford says that all inference must operate on 
the basis of this sort of an assumption whereby, through inductive generalization, what we have 
experienced is taken to be representative of and similar to that which we have not yet 
experienced. He says, “We may go beyond experience by assuming that what we do not know is 
like what we do know; or, in other words, we may add to our experience on the assumption of a 
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 Forrest, “Epistemology of Religion”.  
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uniformity in nature.”19 By including testimony and inference like this Clifford makes his of 
justification system far more flexible and inclusive of a much wider range of beliefs. 
 In this paper, however, we are especially interested in how this sort of evidentialism, as 
represented by Clifford, has been applied to epistemology of religion. As briefly mentioned 
above, beliefs are to be proportioned to the evidence in such a way that partial and incomplete 
evidence can only justify less-than-certain belief. At the same time, only conclusive evidence 
justifies certainty in belief.
20
 Thus there can be varying degrees of confidence corresponding to 
varying degrees of evidential force. This principle is taken over directly into epistemology of 
religion. The contention, then, is that religious beliefs (e.g., belief in God) must be justified on 
the basis of evidence just as any kind of belief must be held in accord with the evidence. 
Religious beliefs require evidence and only conclusive evidence can justify certainty in belief. 
By and large these evidentialist criteria of justification have been employed to show that 
belief in God is at least unjustified and at most irrational. According to Clark, “The evidentialist 
objection [to belief in God] may be formalized as follows: (1) Belief in God is rational only if 
there is sufficient evidence for the existence of God. (2) There is not sufficient evidence for the 
existence of God. (3) Therefore, belief in God is irrational.”21 Premise (1), that belief in God 
requires evidence, is based upon the idea that the truth of God’s existence is clearly not 
something known in the basis of firsthand experience as outlined above. That is, God’s existence 
is not known by sense experience nor is it self-evident. Premise (2), that there is insufficient 
evidence, is “…usually based on a negative assessment of the success of theistic proofs or 
arguments. Following Hume and Kant, the standard arguments for the existence of God– 
                                                          
19
 Ibid., 306. 
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 Forrest, “Epistemology of Religion”. 
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cosmological, teleological and ontological– are judged to be defective in one respect or 
another.”22 In addition to this, some problems (e.g., the problem of evil) are typically posed as 
counter evidence. On the basis of these sorts of arguments, Antony Flew suggests that “…the 
only reasonable posture is that of the negative atheist or the agnostic.”23 In the same way, it is 
reported that Bertrand Russell claimed that if he were he were to ever be “Confronted with the 
Almighty, [that] he would ask, ‘Sir, why did you not give me better evidence?’.”24 
Defenders of the rationality of belief in God have offered several responses to the 
evidentialist rejection of belief in God. I will mention three leading lines of response before 
formulating a Presuppositional response. For our purposes we can conveniently treat these first 
three responses as beginning with a denial of either premise (1), that belief in God requires 
evidence, or premise (2), that there is insufficient evidence for belief in God. 
Natural Theology 
The position roughly known as natural theology represents what is perhaps the most straight 
forward reaction to the evidentialist rejection of God. It is straight forward in that it agrees with 
the evidentialist position in terms of methodology and differs with it only in terms of results. By 
methodology, I mean, the method by which they hope to assess the reasonableness of belief in 
God. They agree about what would constitute a good reason for believing in God and thus they 
agree about what justification is, at least in this one area. Both views agree that premise (1) is 
true; that belief in God requires evidence in order to be rationally and justifiably held. The 
natural theologians disagree with the evidentialist rejection of belief in God, then, by negating 
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 Clark, “Religious Epistemology”. 
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 Antony Flew, The Presumption of Atheism, quoted in Clark, Return To Reason, 3. 
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premise (2). That is, they are convinced that rather than pointing to non-theism (i.e., agnosticism 
or atheism), the evidence instead points to theism as the most reasonable conclusion. 
 Classical Natural Theological arguments for God’s existence include cosmological, 
teleological, ontological, and design arguments, typically associated with thinkers like Aquinas, 
Anselm, and Paley. Consequently, the natural theologians’ main project is to reformulate, 
rearticulate, and perhaps supplement these arguments so that they are stronger and more 
convincing. While it is beyond the scope this paper to consider the work that has been done this 
area, many philosophers and theologians have undertaken exactly this task.
25
 Some have 
undertaken to provide proofs which would justify certainty in believing in God. Others have 
settled for demonstrating that based on the evidence there is a great likelihood that God exists 
and therefore good reason for some less-that-certain belief in him.
26
 Thus the debate between 
evidentialists and natural theologians is rather straight forward and is understood by both of them 
to be a debate entirely over what the evidence suggests. 
Wittgensteinian Fideism 
Wittgensteinian Fideism stands out as another response to Enlightenment evidentialism and, 
more specifically, to similar sorts of challenges that came from the Logical Positivists.
27
 Before 
discussing the position there is one important caveat: although this position bears the name 
“Wittgensteinian”, it is not at all clear that Wittgenstein would have endorsed this position or, for 
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 Among them are Richard Swineburne, The Existence of God, (New York: Oxford University Press).  See also  
William Lane Craig, Gary R. Habermas, Paul D. Feinberg in Five Views of Apologetics ed. Steven Cowen, (Grand 
Rapids: Zondervan Publishing Hosue). 
 
26
 Forrest, “Epistemology of Religion”. 
 
27
In fact, Logical Positivism may classify as a sub-species of evidentialism or perhaps as an application of 





that matter, exactly what he would endorse.
28
 There is an ongoing debate over how exactly to 
interpret his scattered and somewhat enigmatic remarks on religious matters.
29
 The name is 
nevertheless fitting, in a sense, because this approach to epistemology of religion is predicated 
upon a distinctively Wittgensteinian approach to philosophy of language and in particular upon 
his game theory of meaning. 
To understand how a Wittgensteinian Fideist would formulate a response to 
Enlightenment evidentialism’s critique of religious belief, we must briefly consider 
Wittgenstein’s game theory of meaning in relation to one of its predecessors, the Logical 
Positivists. The positivists offered a theory of meaning or a set of criteria by which language was 
to be assessed. Roughly speaking, their theory of meaning implied that “…a piece discourse has 
meaning if an only if it is either analytically true or false, or capable of verification or 
disverification.”30 Thus the presence or absence of meaning was a function of the presence or 
absence of a truth value (i.e. being either true or false). The motivation for positivist program 
resembles that of Enlightenment evidentialism: both traditions are aimed at restricting careless, 
fanatical, or groundless believing. Furthermore, both operate by subjecting beliefs to rigorous 
examination and strict criteria that appeal to empirical evidence or firsthand experience. 
According to the positivist view, if one can determine the truth value of a given utterance 
either by verification or by a priori analysis, then the utterance is meaningful. Likewise, if one 
                                                          
28
 Richard Amesbury, “Fideism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2013).  Amesbury 
points that it is very unlikely that that Wittgenstein would have agreed this particular application of his theories. He 
further says that “…Wittgensteinians generally regard ‘Wittgensteinian Fideism’ as a caricature not only of 
Wittgenstein's views but also of their own”. 
 
29
  Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Epistemology of Religion,” in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology ed. Greco and Sosa 
(Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 1999) 303-324. 
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cannot determine a truth value by such criteria then it is categorized as meaningless.
31
 On this 
view only some non-abstract pieces of discourse were considered to be genuinely meaningful. 
Metaphysical language, ethical language, and religious language, as a result, were all considered 
meaningless. This is because they do not have truth values that can be easily determined 
according to the strict positivist criteria.
32
 Thus, while the Enlightenment evidentialist would 
claim that there is insufficient evidence for belief in God, the positivist would argue a more 
radical point: because religious beliefs are not the sorts of things that can be empirically or 
analytically verified, they are in fact not even truly meaningful. Again, religious language is not 
meaningful in the way that scientific discourse is clearly meaningful and straightforwardly 
descriptive of the apparent states of affairs. 
In his later work, and most clearly in his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein 
responded in opposition to the positivist view by proposing an altogether different theory of 
meaning. He vigorously opposed the labeling of all religious language as meaningless. He 
thought that “…if an interpretation of religion makes religious seem silly, pointless, or 
outmoded, that interpretation should be dismissed out of hand as not knowing what it is talking 
about.”33 Rather, there must be some other way of understanding meaning whereby 
metaphysical, ethical, and religious language is not meaningless per se, but also isn’t to be 
assessed by the same exact criteria as more “scientific” sorts of language. The solution, for 
Wittgenstein, was to think about meaning in terms of its use and use in terms of what he called 
“forms of life”. Forms of life, very roughly speaking, are ways of getting along in the world that 
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are shared by groups of people. A group of people who partake in a common form of life have a 
set of assumptions or a shared understanding which loosely unites them. Furthermore, such a 
group of people have a common or shared understanding about how to speak and use language. 
Thus they can be said to be playing the same “language game”. Their common form of life 
provides them with a loose set of implicit rules for the game. These rules govern what utterances 
are meaningful or count as legitimate “moves” within the game. Thus an utterance is meaningful 
based on its function within a language game.
34
 
This theory is then applied to epistemology of religion in such a way that religious 
believers are said to be playing a certain language game.
35
 There are several components 
underlying this particular application the game theory of meaning that are well worth bringing to 
light. Richard Amesbury articulates several of these underlying theses: 
According to this interpretation [of Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning], religion is a self-
contained and primarily expressive enterprise, governed by its own internal logic or 
“grammar.” This view—commonly called Wittgensteinian Fideism—is variously 
characterized as entailing one or more of the following distinct (but arguably inter-
related) theses: (1) that religion is logically cut off from other aspects of life; (2) that 
religious discourse is essentially self-referential and does not allow us to talk about 
reality; (3) that religious beliefs can be understood only by religious believers; and (4) 




With these underlying commitments in mind, the fideistic nature of this position becomes quite 
clear. The fact that religious language is fundamentally expressive seems to be the ground for its 
logically isolated character. The logically isolated character, in turn, is what earns this position 
the title “fideism”. Fideism, here, is roughly any position that sees the pursuit of religious truth 
                                                          
34
 Anat Biletzki, “Ludwig Wittgenstein,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2013). 
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 As mentioned above, this interpretation and application of his theory of meaning is not entirely uncontroversial. In 
fact, some interpreters would argue that this is a misreading, an oversimplification, and a misapplication of this 
theory of meaning. For an example, see Dallas High’s Logic, Persons, and Belief, (New York: Oxford Univeristy 
Press, 1967) 27-130. 
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as about faith and not about reason. Thus fideism will sometimes involve a commitment to 
religious belief without reasons to back it up at all. In more radical instances it may even allow 
for belief in spite of reasons to the contrary. 
In a similar fashion, Peter Forrest says that Wittgensteinian Fideism involves both an 
“autonomy thesis” and an “incommensurability” thesis.37 First, the autonomy thesis is roughly 
that religious beliefs can only be seen as justified in terms of internal criteria. According to this 
thesis, each religion is its own free-standing, self-referential entity. Second, there is an 
incommensurability thesis which says, roughly, “…that religious utterances are unlike scientific 
or metaphysical claims and so we are confusing different uses of language if we judge religious 
utterances by the standards of science or metaphysics.”38 Thus religious language is not taken to 
function in the exact same way that scientific and metaphysical language purports to be about or 
descriptive of the world. They are being used in different ways and for different purposes. This is 
similar to what Wolterstorff says in his formulation of Wittgensteinian Fideism
39
: 
Religious “belief” and the language used to express it, these often pictorial in character, 
give expression to one’s religious form of life and are at the same time a component 
therein…Thus, to verbalize a religious “belief” is to express, often in pictorial language, 




On this formulation, religious language is primarily expressive as opposed to more scientific 
language which purports to be descriptive of extramental things. In order to understand what is 
meant by a religious utterance, that is, what it expresses, one must of course be a participant in 
that form of life. At the same time, in order to know that something is meaningless, or not a 
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 Nicholas Wolterstorff, of course, is not a Wittgensteinian Fideist. The passage I am about to cite is part of a book 
chapter in which he outlines the position in question. 
 
40





genuine expression of the form of life, one must likewise have a participant’s perspective. In the 
final analysis this formulation of Wittgensteinian Fideism appears to be a modified version of 
positivism.
41
 After all, it appears as though this theory still bars religious language from being 
genuinely descriptive of reality in a way that scientific language is. A religious speaker, then, 
who says that “There is a God,” is not uttering something that is true or false, but is rather 
expressing something. For many religious thinkers, however, such a theory will not do.
42
 They 
require a more robust, realistic understanding of their truth claims. 
In any case, a Wittgensteinian Fideist of this sort has the resources to overturn the 
positivist accusation that religious language is meaningless. Such language is not meaningless 
per se. It simply has meaning in a way that is different from more straightforward scientific 
language. It is just that it is embedded in a different form of life and thus part of a different 
language game. But what of the evidentialists’ claim that belief in God is nevertheless 
unreasonable because it is not based upon sufficient evidence? The Wittgensteinian Fideists 
stand ready with an answer: “while it is appropriate to ask questions about justification within a 
language game it is a mistake to ask about the justification of “playing” the game in question. In 
this way epistemology is relativised to language games, themselves related to forms of life, and 
the one used for assessing religious claims is less stringent than evidentialism.”43 Thus, 
according to Wittgensteinian Fideism, the evidentialist objection to belief in God may be rejected 
as irrelevant. Unless it is inherent in a given religious system that their beliefs should be argued 
for according to evidentialist criteria then such criteria do not apply. 
                                                          
41
 Wolterstorff, Epistemology of Religion, 319. 
 
42
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augmented forms of Wittgensteinian Fideism that allow for non-expressive, cognitively meaningful interpretations 
of religious and theological language. 
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Consider this in terms of the evidentialist objection to belief in God as formalized above. 
While the natural theologian denied premise (2), that there is there is insufficient evidence for 
belief in God, the Wittgensteinian Fideist have taken a quite different approach. Earlier we said 
that the natural theologian agreed with the evidentialist in terms of methodology and differed 
with them only in their evaluation of the evidence (and thus in their conclusion as well). The 
Wittgensteinian Fideist, on the other hand, would clearly disagree with them in terms of 
methodology. That is, they would deny premise (1), that belief in God is the kind of belief that 
needs to be justified on the basis of evidence. 
Reformed Epistemology 
The next alternative to Enlightenment evidentialism to consider is the so-called Reformed 
Epistemology is. Like the Wittgensteinian Fideists they ultimately deny premise (1); that belief 
in God must be based upon argument and evidence. However, they do this for quite different 
reasons. In their denial of premise (1), they begin by directly attacking evidentialism itself and 
then by arguing that it is reasonable for one to believe in God without propositional evidence. 




 In the first place the Reformed Epistemology objection begins by making explicit the sort 
of noetic structure that is implied by Enlightenment evidentialism. By a noetic structure is meant 
the way in which one’s beliefs and their justification are related to or connected with each 
other.
45
 The Reformed Epistemologists argue that Enlightenment evidentialism entails a sort of 
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 Generally speaking, foundationalism refers to the idea that some of our 
beliefs are basic while others are non-basic. Basic beliefs are accepted and justifiably believed on 
their own and not in connection with other beliefs. These beliefs are like the foundation of a 
building. Other beliefs, however, can be “built” upon these beliefs. These are non-basic beliefs. 
We believe these things on the basis of other, basic, beliefs. Non-basic beliefs are inferred from 
basic beliefs. These non-basic beliefs correspond to the super-structure of a building that is built 
upon the foundation. The all-important question that this begs is which beliefs are considered 
basic and why. 
As we saw in the above treatment of Clifford’s essay, evidentialism ultimately relies 
upon firsthand experience. Thus, for the evidentialist, a basic belief is justified if and only if it is 
“self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible” and a non-basic belief is justified if and only 
if it is “…inferable from a set of beliefs that are self-evident, evident to the senses, or 
incorrigible.”47  We may refer to this position as “classical foundationalism”.48 This 
foundationalist commitment ultimately explains why the evidentialists hold that belief in God 
demands evidence. Belief in God is clearly non-basic (because it fails to meet the criteria for 
being basic). Thus, by definition, it must be inferred or deduced from a set of propositions (i.e. it 
needs to be based on propositional evidence). Reformed Epistemologist attack this assumption. 
 Their general strategy is to show that if this position is consistently applied then it turns 
out to be self-defeating. Evidentialism is, they maintain, self-referentially incoherent and should 
be dismissed without hesitation. To elucidate this point they begin by showing that very few 
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beliefs can be justified according to strict evidentialist criteria. Accordingly, Kelly James Clark 
points out some of our limitations when it comes to classical foundationalism: 
The first problem with the evidentialist objection is that the universal demand for 
evidence simply cannot be met in a large number of cases with the cognitive equipment 
that we have. No one has ever been able to offer proofs for the existence of other persons, 
inductive beliefs (e.g., that the sun will rise in the future), or the reality of the past 
(perhaps, as Bertrand Russell cloyingly puzzled, we were created five minutes ago with 
our memories intact) that satisfy [evidentialist] requirements for proof.
49
 
Thus evidentialism is automatically suspect because, if consistently applied, it seems to rob us of 
a number of beliefs that we normally take to be very secure. This seems to create something of a 
dilemma for evidentialists. For instance, if they say we that we may believe without evidence 
that other people have minds, then they have abandoned the very heart of their program: that 
“…it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient 
evidence.”50 On the other hand, if they say that we cannot believe in other minds without proof 
then their theory will devolve into a fairly straightforward skepticism about almost any truth-
regarding claim. The Reformed Epistemologist’s point here, or one of their points, is that is that 
belief in God is like belief in other minds. The two seem to sink or swim together.
51
 
 These concerns, however, do not in and of themselves amount to a refutation of 
evidentialism. Rather, it only shows that if it is the correct position to hold then in the final 
analysis we are justified in believing only a few things. In order to formulate a refutation of 
evidentialism based upon these observations the Reformed Epistemologist will need to do more. 
This, however, is not a terribly daunting task. One must simply subject evidentialism or classical 
foundationalism to its own standards and see that it collapses under its own weight. The crucial 
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question is why should someone believe that evidentialism or classical foundationalism is the 
correct or best theory of justification? The tenets of classical foundationalism are not self-
evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible. Thus, they are not themselves basic beliefs. 
Therefore, by their own standard, in order for them to be justifiably believed, they must be 
inferable from a set of such basic beliefs. This, however, is not an easy task and has not yet been 
done. From this, Clark concludes that classical foundationalism “…by its own account, is 
irrational. If classical foundationalism were true, it would be irrational to accept it. Better simply 
to reject it!”52 Thus, Enlightenment evidentialism can be aptly described as self-referentially 
incoherent.
53
 On this basis the evidentialist objection to belief in God can be overturned. 
From here the Reformed Epistemologist can move on and work towards giving an 
account for why belief in God is in fact justified. To see they do this it will help to compare and 
contrast some underlying commitments of both evidentialists and Reformed Epistemologists. 
Despite their rejection of classical foundationalism, Reformed Epistemologists, in the final 
analysis, actually hold onto a version of foundationalism and modify it adopting some 
externalist, and specifically reliabilist, elements. 
Above we classified evidentialism as a deontological theory of justification; that is, a 
view which maintains that justification is fundamentally about to living up to one’s epistemic 
duties. Such a view can be more generally categorized as “internalist” epistemology because, on 
this view, the justification of a given belief is a matter of whether some conditions internal to the 
believer have been met or not. Reformed Epistemology, on the other hand, is an “externalist” 
epistemology, meaning that justification is a matter of whether some conditions external to a 
believer have been met or not. The question, then, becomes what are these person-external 
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criteria for justification? For the Reformed Epistemologist, the criteria involve reliable 
knowledge sources. Thus, they are reliabilists, meaning that beliefs formed according properly 
functioning belief-forming mechanisms are taken to be justified.
54
 We will outline their specific 
criteria in greater detail below, for now it is sufficient to note that the Reformed Epistemologists 
are externalists and the evidentialists are internalists. 
Despite these initial differences, both evidentialists and Reformed Epistemologists have 
the same view about the architecture of knowledge. That is, both subscribe to some form of 
foundationalism. The differences outlined above reveal differences in the criteria of justification 
and have implications for what each view take to be basic beliefs. Thus, when Plantinga rejects 
evidentialism with its classical foundationalism, he is concerned with the rejection of their 
criteria for what counts as basic and not with rejecting foundationalism per se. Clark points out 
that, 
Where his foundationalism departs from classical foundationalism is in his specification 
of properly basic beliefs. The classical foundationalist has a rather sparse set of properly 
basic beliefs. Plantinga’s foundationalism is much less parsimonious in its specification 
of properly basic beliefs. He also includes memory beliefs, beliefs about the external 
world, acceptance of testimony, and belief in God, among others.
55
 
Thus, they contend that belief in God is justified insofar as it is indeed a basic belief. The 
question that this now raises is why can it be taken as basic? How is it possible to have this more 
liberal set of foundational beliefs? In the first place, it is helpful to notice that the reason for 
rejecting belief in God as non-basic has been removed because the classical foundationalist 
criteria for basicality have been removed. Thus, there is no reason why it cannot be considered 
properly basic. This, however, seems to open the door for almost any belief to considered basic. 
Thus, the next task for the reformed epistemologist is to show why belief in God is somehow 
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The Reformed Epistemologist thus needs some criteria for basic belief that allows belief 
in God to be basic and yet is not so permissive as to allow just anything to be considered 
properly basic. By properly basic is meant any belief that does not need inferential support. 
Plantinga says that the way to go about this is to consider how certain beliefs can be considered 
basic in some situations but not in others. For instance, if I am being presented with the image of 
a tree, then, all things being equal, I can take my belief that there is a tree before me as basic; it 
does not need inferential support. If, however, I am not in a situation where I am having such 
presentations then I cannot have properly basic beliefs about a tree being in front of me. The 
same holds true for belief in God: 
What the Reformed Epistemologist holds is that there are widely realized circumstances 
in which belief in God is properly basic; but why should that commit him to the idea that 
just about any belief is properly basic in any circumstances, or even to the vastly weaker 
claim that for any belief there are circumstances in which it is properly basic?...the fact 
that he rejects the criterion of proper basicality purveyed by classical foundationalism 
does not mean that he is committed to supposing just anything is properly basic.
57
 
On this basis belief in God can be considered properly basic without this resulting in the absurd 
consequence of any belief being considered properly basic as well. This solution, however, raises 
still further questions. Most importantly, how do we know that the circumstances are realized 
such that belief in God is in fact properly basic? While Plantinga does deal with this issue
58
, we 
need not entertain the issue further. It is sufficient to note that, at least “…in Faith and Reason 
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the emphasis is on epistemic rights” as opposed to epistemic obligations.59 That is, Plantinga is 
here arguing that one is within their epistemic rights when they believe in God without 
argumentation, and he is not arguing that one therefore must believe in God.  
Towards Presuppositionalist Rejection of Evidentialism: The Myth of Neutrality 
In the last section we considered some of the main contours of the discussion in contemporary 
epistemology of religion. Following Peter Forrest we have viewed this as a debate over whether 
Enlightenment evidentialism should inform the belief component of religious faith. With this 
background we can now turn to the main focus of the paper: an alternative response to 
Enlightenment evidentialism that finds its origins in the Christian Presuppositional method of 
apologetics. While the previous responses have involved epistemological debate, this alternative 
involves some meta-philosophical concerns which are in turn motivated by certain theological 
concerns. As mentioned in an earlier footnote, what follows will not be a full-bodied formulation 
of the Presuppositional method of apologetics, but just a formulation how they might reject 
Enlightenment evidentialism. Thus we will not need to frame these meta-philosophical concerns 
in terms of their theological foundations. Rather, we can appreciate these meta-philosophical 
concerns by framing them as a response to Enlightenment evidentialism.
60
  This will involve four 
topics of discussion: I.) an unavoidable interdependence between epistemology and metaphysics, 
II.) the nature of presuppositions and ultimate truth criterion, III.) how these two topics can be 
woven together to elucidate the concept of a worldview, and then, IV.) what all of this means for 
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epistemology of religion and how this can be formulated as rejection of Enlightenment 
evidentialism. 
I.) The Interdependence of Metaphysics and Epistemology 
In chapter 3 of his Presuppositional Apologetics, Greg Bahnsen argues for the unavoidable 
interdependence of metaphysics and epistemology.
61
 On this view, metaphysics and 
epistemology are necessarily and unavoidably related. Neither of these areas of inquiry has 
complete primacy over the other and neither can be done in a way that is truly independent of the 
other. Rather they have a relationship whereby no advances can be made in either field without 
necessitating some conclusions the other. For instance, one cannot develop a metaphysic without 
an epistemological method underwriting it. If someone attempted to, their theory would be no 
more than unjustified, ungrounded conjecture. Likewise one cannot develop an epistemological 
system without reference to and dependence upon some necessary metaphysical conclusions. 
The relationship between the areas of inquiry can thus be described as unavoidably circular. Of 
primary importance for us here is that there are no metaphysically neutral theories of knowledge. 
Bahnsen begins in his argument for this by addressing what he believes to be a common 
misunderstanding in philosophical methodology. He asserts that in our day there is a common 
but mistaken view which says that we can “…settle matters concerning epistemology and 
method prior to, and in abstraction from, questions of metaphysics.”62 He then goes on to expose 
the error in this view. I will expand upon his work and illustrate the nature of their independence 
from two different perspectives. First we will consider how we argue for or come to believe in 
theories of justification and knowledge. I will show that such argumentation, if it will be 
convincing at all, will involve reliance upon some previously held metaphysical beliefs. 
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Secondly, we will consider how theories of knowledge and justification in and of themselves 
entail some metaphysical conclusions. From both of these perspectives we will see that 
epistemology should not be thought of as a metaphysically neutral inquiry.  
Part of Bahnsen’s argument hinges upon a problem with defending theories of 
justification. Justification is something that can be ascribed to either beliefs or believers. When a 
belief is justified this means, at minimum, that our affirming of this belief is reasonable. That is, 
when we affirm that the belief is true we do so in a way that is not in violation of the basic 
canons of good epistemic practice. Similarly, when a believer is justified this means in the act of 
believing they are not violating these basic canons of good epistemic practice. Also, when 
believers are justified, they can usually expect their belief to be true. I suggest, along with 
Bahnsen, that a functional commonality in various theories of justification is that justification 
always involves some connection or other between beliefs, the truth or falsity of these beliefs, 
and the expectation that a believer has that his beliefs are indeed true. That is, regardless of what 
specific criteria and theories are offered, they are always offered, at least in part, for the sake of 
ensuring the maximum amount of true beliefs and the minimum amount of false beliefs. “…The 
notion of justified belief is related to that of true belief in that justifying reasons for a belief are 
those that will most [often] lead a person to hold beliefs that are true.”63 Thus, the justification of 
a belief and the truth of this belief are always related. At the very least they are related in that 
justificational theories are supposed increase the likelihood that we will end up with true beliefs. 
To illustrate these points, consider what happens if Smith proposes J, his theory of 
justification. One of his intentions when offering J, if not his chief intention, is that if its criteria 
are met then we will have an increased likelihood of having true beliefs in a non-accidental, 
knowledge-creating way. If the criteria laid out in J are met and there are no defeaters, then our 
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true beliefs can count as knowledge (at least according to the view that knowledge is something 
like justified true belief). However, if we have a conversation with Smith and he tells us about 
his theory J, we would do well to ask why he maintains that J is the best justificational theory to 
hold. Or, far less stringently, we should ask why he maintains that it is valuable for the 
justification of some of his beliefs some of the time. 
 The kind of answers given to these questions illustrates some of the interdependence of 
metaphysics and epistemology that I wish to point out. Given the connection between 
justification and true beliefs just described, any theory of justification that is proposed will have 
to be argued for, to some degree, on the basis of its success. That is, a theory of justification can 
only be seen as tenable if it can be argumentatively demonstrated that the theory does in fact 
provide some truth-ensuring criteria. This is because it is the very purpose of the theory of 
justification is to provide some criteria according to which beliefs may be counted on as being 
true (or at least counted on as being more likely true than false). The unavoidable problem is that 
any argumentation or reasons given for a theory of justification must necessarily make reference 
to some already-known-to-be-true states of affairs: 
The kind of [criteria] that will be sanctioned as offering “justification” for belief… will 
be so selected because these lead to beliefs counted as true in a satisfactory number of 
cases…justification is conferred on certain [criteria] because of the relatively high degree 
of success they have in engendering true belief…Now if types of [criteria] are to be 
sanctioned in this fashion, it is obvious that knowledge of the existing states of affairs is 
essential. One could not estimate the success factor for particular kinds of [criteria] unless 
he possessed some knowledge of truth (propositions corresponding to existing states of 
affairs) with which to make comparisons…Epistemological considerations are not 
capricious guesses; they are given because someone feels they are appropriate for the 
reality in which he lives.
64
 
Thus, the only way Smith can know that his theory is the best one is if he has he somehow 
already has sufficient knowledge the states of affairs. Likewise, in order to argue for his theory 
                                                          
64





he must at some point make reference to this same pool of knowledge. Indeed, the only way 
anyone can have reasons for holding their preferred theory of justification is if they “…already 
know something about the world.”65 The conclusion that Bahnsen draws from this is that is 
impossible, in terms of philosophical methodology, to begin by developing an epistemological 
theory without reference to at least some beliefs about what the world is roughly like (a 
metaphysical question).
66
 Put concisely, we do not come to hold theories of knowledge and 
justification in a philosophical vacuum. Instead, we become convinced of one theory or another 
only upon careful reflection on the system in question and always with reference to our previous 
life experience, i.e. some beliefs about the reality in which we live. 
 To be clear I am not at this point going so far as to say that every epistemology always 
brings in some full, robust metaphysical system (though some philosophies seem do something 
like this, e.g. Plato’s theory of the forms, which supports to both his metaphysical and his 
epistemological theories). Rather, I am arguing for the less controversial but easily overlooked 
point that epistemology is never a metaphysically neutral subject matter. In order for a theory of 
knowledge to be convincing to us to we must rely on some underlying beliefs depicting what the 
states of affairs are at least roughly like. Only with recourse to such beliefs can we validate a 
theory of knowledge. Thus we can see that there is some interdependence between metaphysics 
and epistemology at least in the sense that we are unable to develop or believe theories of 
justification without reliance upon some beliefs about the states of affairs. These beliefs fall 
under the category of metaphysics, broadly conceived. 
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To further illustrate this conclusion we can briefly consider theories of knowledge and 
justification from another perspective. Rather than investigating how we become convinced of 
certain theories, we can consider the content and structure of these theories in and of themselves. 
To do this we could review small web of general metaphysical presuppositions that hang 
together and underwrite theories of knowledge and justification.
67
 I would like to suggest that 
these kinds of metaphysical beliefs are universal and unavoidable for all epistemological 
systems.
68
 First, every theory of knowledge necessarily presupposes, at the very least, that 
human beings do in fact have a sufficient mental capacity for entertaining beliefs about some 
part of the reality in which they live, whatever that reality may be. Secondly, these theories 
always involve some explanation of how we actually come to, or should come to, hold beliefs 
about whatever parts of reality are available to us. That is, epistemological and justificational 
theories make reference to and rely upon some particular faculties or knowledge sources that are 
taken to be the grounds for our beliefs. In the final analysis though, these two presuppositions 
can be collapsed into one: that we are connected to our environment in some epistemic manner; 
that because the states of affairs are what they are, our faculties in conjunction with our 
environment can engender some beliefs about these states of affairs. 
The very idea of a justificational theory or a theory of knowledge presupposes some state 
of affairs whereby we are epistemically connected to our environment in an appropriate way. 
When a theory of justification or some criterion for knowledge is offered, this involves taking a 
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stance on the specific nature of our epistemic connection with our environment and then parsing 
out some of the ramifications of this connection. Taking such stance as this entails, at least 
implicitly, some further stance about what the states of affairs roughly are or what the world is 
roughly like. Again, this is not to say that such a theory necessarily smuggles in or implies some 
robust, systematized metaphysic, but rather that it is at least not a metaphysically neutral theory. 
Put concisely, since a theory of justification or knowledge involves some specific epistemic 
connection to the world, it thus presupposes some states of affairs which match this theory. To 
illustrate this in somewhat generic terms, consider empiricism and rationalism. Both of these 
systems presuppose that we have some sort of epistemic connection with reality. At the same 
time, however, they disagree over exactly what this connection is like. Roughly speaking, an 
empiricist believes that this connection is fundamentally mediated by our senses while a 
rationalist believes that it is by our rational faculties. Consequently, both the empiricist and the 
rationalist would have to give at least slightly different accounts of the states of affairs. That is, 
their epistemological systems have slightly different metaphysical presuppositions. 
To continue with this example, in order for the empiricist to have the best theory, it must 
be the case that the states of affairs roughly correspond to or at least do not contradict their view 
that we are epistemically connected to our environment through our senses. These states of 
affairs are, at least to some degree, different from the states of affairs that undergird the 
rationalist position. Consider, alternatively, the position of some radical skeptics. A radical 
skeptic, for our purposes, can be defined as one who denies that there is an epistemic connection 
with the world or at least denies that we can know about such an epistemic connection if there is 
one. I would suggest that such a skeptic is no more metaphysically neutral than the rationalist or 





point out reasons for doubting any metaphysical theses. However, the very assertion that there is 
no epistemic connection with reality, or that we cannot know about such a connection, is a 
metaphysically loaded assertion. In his view, the skeptic is dependent upon the states of affairs 
being one and not another; namely, that there is no epistemic connection between us and the 
outside world or that at least that if there is one that we cannot know about it with certainty. 
 From this discussion may rightly conclude that there is no metaphysical neutrality when 
it comes to epistemology. It is not as though we can develop or become convinced of a theory of 
knowledge or justification without recourse to some beliefs about what the world is like. We also 
saw that justificational theories and theories of knowledge always entail some metaphysical 
beliefs. If it is true that epistemology and metaphysics are connected in this way, then debate 
between adherents of radically different systems can be somewhat problematic. We will turn to 
this now. 
II.) Presuppositions and Ultimate Truth Criteria 
Having established that metaphysics and epistemology are unavoidably connected in this way, 
we can now start to touch upon a similar point about philosophical argumentation. In this section 
we will consider the kinds of standards that are appealed to when determining whether a given 
proposition is true or false. To do this we will consider two overlapping topics: presuppositions 
and ultimate truth criteria. Much of this section is a reflection of John Frame’s work.69 
 Frame describes a presupposition as a kind belief that one is committed to in a 
foundational sort of way. He contends that amongst our wide network of beliefs there are some 
beliefs that play a more basic role and foundational upon which other beliefs are built, as it were. 
Frame first offers a general definition of presuppositions: “A presupposition is a belief that takes 
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precedence over another and therefore serves as a criterion for another.”70 Take, for instance, the 
law of non-contradiction: that a thing cannot be both P and not-P at the same time and in the 
same sense. While we do not very often entertain the belief that this law obtains, it is 
nevertheless is foundational in that it undergirds just about all of our thinking and argumentation 
and functions as a criterion according to which other beliefs are judged. In this way it is 
presupposed in just about all of our thinking. In addition to this, he specifies a certain kind of 
presupposition that he calls an “ultimate presupposition”. As the name indicates, he uses this 
term to refer to a presuppositional belief “…over which no other takes precedence.”71 That is, 
there are certain presuppositions that are held onto or committed to with a special degree of 
commitment. Frame says of these kinds of presuppositions that:  
Everyone has them because everyone has some commitment that at a particular time 
(granted, it may change) is “basic” to him. Everyone has a scale of values in which one 
loyalty takes precedence over another until we reach one that takes precedence over all 




The idea is that if we ask someone why they believe what they believe they will likely offer 
some other belief or reason. If we kept pressing them and asking give further reasons for these 
reasons, they will eventually arrive at some basic kind of commitment like this that is not 
supported by some deeper more foundational commitment. At this point we will have reached 
the end of the chain of their beliefs, we have arrived a belief with no further external support. 
It is worth noting some of the differences between presuppositions in general and 
ultimate presuppositions. In addition to the level of precedence, there also appears to be 
difference in exactly what kind of beliefs they are and how they are held. When offering his 
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general definition of presuppositions, Frame simply classifies them as a sort of belief that takes 
precedence over other beliefs. However, when defining ultimate presuppositions, he adds that 
they are a sort of value or loyalty. I bring this up to point out that, on Frame’s view, ultimate 
presuppositions seem to be more akin to dispositions or tendencies than to mere propositional 
beliefs. That is, while ultimate presuppositions are without a doubt a certain kind of belief which 
entails propositional content, they are often held onto and reasoned from as though they were 
something very valuable and indeed worth being loyal to and committed to. For this reason it is 
difficult to elucidate what exactly an ultimate presupposition is without using some theological 
or religious language. For instance, a Christian’s ultimate presupposition or ultimate 
commitment should be to Jesus Christ as King, Savior, Lord, and God, “…and hence his word is 
the very criterion, the ultimate standard of truth”.73 The contention is that there are “non-
religious” analogues such that everyone, the religious and the non-religious alike, have ultimate 
commitments. For instance, one may be committed to the idea that the basic deliverances of 
reason or sense perception are sufficient arbiters of truth; that we should trust these deliverances 
as the final authority and condition for truthfulness in all areas of inquiry. Thus, without adhering 
to any religious doctrines, one may nevertheless have an ultimate commitment that is 
functionally analogous to that of the Christian’s ultimate commitment to Jesus Christ. 
Frame maintains that these ultimate presuppositions are a kind of commitment that is 
brought into all of our thinking because they govern all of our thinking. That is, all of our ideas 
are either built upon it as a foundation or are brought into conformity with it somehow. Thus 
they are normative beliefs in the sense that they regulate other beliefs or provide some standard 
by which they can be judged. For this reason he describes them as ultimate truth criteria.
74
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ultimate truth criterion is some belief about what our knowledge sources ultimately are and how 
we ultimately have access to truth. Beliefs of this sort are placed high above other beliefs, given 
precedence, and taken to be a trustworthy and reliable standard for judging all other beliefs and 
ideas. To use the language from above, they involve a belief about what our epistemic 
connection with reality is. Thus they tell us how we should ultimately go about our philosophical 
inquiry. Put in other words, an ultimate truth criterion reveals what final authority that we appeal 
to in making judgments about what is true and false. Naturally, these sorts of commitments or 
beliefs serve as the basis for a given philosophical system. The empiricist, for example, holds 
onto sense perception as the reliable truth-determining authority and thus builds his philosophical 
system in a way that is governed by this truth criterion. Likewise the rationalist holds that human 
reason is the ultimate truth criterion and thus builds a system in line with this truth criterion. 
An important question that comes to mind is how do people come to hold to such a 
criterion and how can they argue for why their criterion should he held over against another? 
Though it may sound strange at first glance, ultimate truth criteria cannot be believed in or 
argued for in a non-circular way.
75
 This is because, by definition, an ultimate presupposition is 
not held onto for any reason beyond itself. This does not mean that they are necessarily picked 
out in an arbitrary fashion and without any reason whatsoever.
76
 Ultimate presuppositions are 
typically held because of what is taken to be some inherent virtue of the belief itself. The 
rationalist and empiricist both espouse truth criterion that have at least some prima facie 
attractiveness. According to Frame, every philosophical system or belief system holds to some 
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ultimate truth criterion or other in this manner; that is, in virtue of some inherent quality of the 
truth criterion itself. An implication of this point is that any argument for such a truth criterion 
must rely upon that criterion: 
Every philosophy must use its own standards in proving its conclusions; otherwise it is 
simply inconsistent. Those who believe that human reason is the ultimate authority 
(rationalists) must presuppose the authority if reason in their arguments for rationalism. 
Those who believe in the ultimacy of sense experience must presuppose it in arguing for 
their philosophy (empiricism). And skeptics must be skeptical of their skepticism (a fact 
that is, of course, the Achilles’ heel of skepticism). The point is that when one is arguing 
for an ultimate criterion, whether Scripture, the Koran, human reason, sensation, or 
whatever, one must use criteria compatible with that conclusion. If that is circularity, then 
everybody is guilty of circularity.
77
 
The purpose of this discussion is to suggest and illustrate that there is no philosophical neutrality 
when it comes to discussing criterion for truth. It is impossible to offer a cogent argument for one 
truth criterion or another without presupposing that truth criterion in the argument and then 
arguing by that criterion. 
III.) Worldviews 
The last two sections have shown that philosophical neutrality or non-circularity is not as easy to 
come by as one might initially assume. In the first section this came out when we saw that there 
are no metaphysically neutral ways to actually argue for a theory of knowledge. Likewise, 
theories of knowledge in and of themselves always entail some metaphysical commitments. We 
also saw that there is no philosophical neutrality when it comes to the discussion of ultimate truth 
criterion. While these first two sections involved a negative assertion, that philosophical 
neutrality is impossible in these areas, in the present section we will consider a positive assertion: 
that because there is no philosophical neutrality in these areas that therefore our thinking and 
reasoning is relative to a “worldview” as will be defined shortly. 
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 Given the impossibility of neutrality and the fact that we cannot reason without 
presuppositions it should come as no surprise that equally rational people can arrive at 
completely different and even contradictory understandings of what the world is like. In fact it is 
easy to see why this happens once we acknowledge our circular reliance upon presuppositions 
and that the fact that these epistemological commitments entail at least some further 
metaphysical commitments. Suppose, for instance, that Smith and Jones have different ultimate 
truth criterion. Not only will they have to argue for these commitment in the circular way 
described above, but they must also presuppose some necessary metaphysical conclusions to 
match their truth criterion. What this means is that before they have even begun in their 
philosophical inquiry they already have at least slightly different views of what some states of 
affairs are like. In the same way they already have different conceptions of what will make for a 
convincing argument and what will suffice as evidence for a given proposition. These differences 
begin to show as they start to consider different philosophical questions. As Bahnsen says,  
What take to be problems, what kind of analysis they say is required, and what methods 
and standards they use will all be viewed differently. What each school sees as 
amounting to “making a good case” for a basic position – what each will count as 
plausible or not – depends on their own initial perspectives or presuppositions.78 
The result of this is that since Smith and Jones start from different positions they may differ 
greatly in their understanding of the world. They may well provide contradictory answers to 
various philosophical questions they ask. If pressed, they are liable to offer different views of 
what the world is ultimately like. 
These observations about presuppositions suggest that all of our reasoning and thinking is 
ultimately worldview-thinking. By this I mean that the non-neutral, presuppositional bases that 
we all work from can, and do, serve as grounds for other beliefs that are formed in a systematic 
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or coherent way. In reasoning from our basic presuppositions we tend to develop a worldview. 
To be sure, our presuppositions do not in and of themselves constitute a robust worldview. 
Nevertheless they do serve as the implicit guides in developing and systematizing one. Most 
basically, then, a worldview is a somewhat systematized, coherent understanding or 
interpretation of what the world is like. A worldview thus consists of the answers to a number of 
crucial philosophical questions. According to Bahnsen, “Each worldview has its presuppositions 
about reality, knowledge, and ethics; these mutually influence and support each other.”79 
Likewise, Clément Vidal offers a comprehensive list of worldview questions that include:  
(a) What is? Ontology (model of being); 
(b) Where does it all come from? Explanation (model of the past); 
(c) Where are we going? Prediction (model of the future); 
(d) What is good and what is evil? Axiology (theory of values); 
(e) How should we act? Praxeology (theory of actions). 
(f) What is true and what is false? Epistemology (theory of knowledge); 




As we are faced with these sorts of philosophical questions the way in which we answer them, as 
mentioned above, will hinge upon our ultimate truth criterion and ultimate commitments. 
Likewise, our answers will most likely cohere with the answers we give for other questions. 
There are many questions that this raises and a handful of implications that should be drawn 
from this. 
 First, one might ask if everyone has a worldview. It has already been established that 
everyone must make use of presuppositions if they are to reason at all. But does it follow from 
this that everyone must participate in the philosophical inquiry that seems to be necessary for the 
development and identification of a worldview? Must one intentionally consider these 
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philosophical questions in order have a worldview? In answer to this question, Vidal makes the 
distinction between implicit and explicit worldviews: “Most people adopt and follow a 
worldview without much thinking. Their worldview remains implicit. They intuitively have a 
representation of the world (components (a)-(c)), know what is good and what is bad (component 
(d)) and have experience on how to act in the world (component (e)). And this is enough to get 
by.”81 On the other hand, an explicit worldview is one that has been developed and adopted in a 
more intentionally. In such cases “…some curious, reflexive, critical, thinking or philosophical 
minds wake up, and start to question their worldviews. They aspire to make it explicit.”82 In 
addition to this distinction, he also asserts that everyone is in need of a worldview. We will 
consider this in just a moment. Before this, we will take up a question that is a corollary to the 
implicit/explicit distinction. 
 If it is possible for a worldview to be held either explicitly or implicitly, then what is it 
like to have a worldview? Or what is a worldview like? One analogy that can be readily made is 
that a worldview is like a pair of glasses. A worldview is like a lens through which one views 
(i.e. interprets or understands) everything in their experience. Just as one who wears glasses 
might forget that they are wearing them so awareness of our worldview can be implicit and need 
not be at the forefront of one’s thinking. Another feature of this analogy is that it can be used to 
illustrate some of the difficulty associated with thinking about one’s own worldview. We almost 
always look through our glasses. It is only by intentionally deciding to look at one’s glasses, and 
much strain on the eyes, that we can actually adjust our focus and look at the lenses that are 
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before our eyes. Much in the same way it is difficult, especially at first, to examine one’s own 
worldview.
83
 Now we can return to the unanswered question above. 
 To continue with the analogy, can we remove our glasses? If so, what sort of difference 
would this make? Would it result in complete blindness, a slightly blurred vision, perhaps 
improved vision? That is, can we reason without a worldview and, if so, what would this be like? 
There are two ways to answer this question. First, there may be a very weak sense in which one 
could abstain from developing or holding to a worldview. One might somehow abstain from 
answering worldview questions and thus ultimately remain agnostic. This is what some sorts of 
skeptics do. They could maintain that we cannot finally settle matters of ontology, explanation, 
prediction, axiology, and praxeology. In this sense they may not develop a robust, content-rich 
worldview in the way that other thinkers typically do. Nevertheless they still have a method, 
albeit a skeptical method, for answering the worldview questions. That is, they still have an 
overriding commitment (e.g., a commitment to skepticism) which guides them in answering 
worldview questions. The skeptic’s guiding principles steer them away from positively affirming 
many things and thus they end up with a strange sort of worldview, perhaps an anti-worldview. 
The skeptic’s anti-worldview is still a worldview of sorts, it just a worldview with very little 
content. It is still a worldview in the sense that a worldview, as defined above, is a systematized 
understanding or interpretation of what the world is like. According to skeptic’s anti-worldview, 
the world is something which we may experience but about which we cannot truly know. From 
this we may conclude, along with Vidal, that “Every one of us is in need of a worldview, 
whether it is implicit or explicit”.84 There may only be one possible exception. One who lacks 









sufficient cognitive faculties may thereby refrains from developing or subscribing to a 
worldview. Thus, we cannot truly reason without a worldview. 
 We can arrive at this conclusion in a more decisive way by considering two related theses 
about the relationship between facts, interpretation, and worldviews. First, consider how Smith 
and Jones, if they have different worldviews, will interpret certain facts differently. Suppose that 
Smith has a roughly Judeo-Christian worldview. Jones, on the other hand, has a materialist 
worldview. When they consider the readily observable fact that, say, “The cat is on the mat”, 
they will understand or interpret this fact in different ways. By this I mean that they will embed 
this fact within different constellations of belief. For Smith, “The cat is on the mat…and 
(implicitly) is in God’s universe”. For Jones, on the other hand “The cat is on the mat…and 
(implicitly) is in a materialist universe”. Thus, at the very least, we can at least accept the 
relatively noncontroversial thesis that a worldview is able to suffice as a fact-interpreting 
framework (i.e. worldviews influence how we interpret facts and what they ultimately mean). 
This phenomenon becomes more relevant as we consider more significant facts. For instance, 
consider how Smith and Jones might interpret the fact that human beings are social creatures. 
Since Smith’s view of reality involves an ultimate personality (i.e., God), personhood and 
sociality will likely be understood as somehow derivative of this. Jones, on the other hand, will 
have to interpret and explain the existence of personhood and sociality differently. Thus, 
pointing out to them the fact that human beings are social entities will mean something quite 
different in both cases.  
 Now, consider a more controversial thesis: not only do worldviews provide this kind of 
interpretive frame work, but that it is impossible to interpret any fact whatsoever outside of a 





merely understood without interpretation. Suppose that someone who attempts to reason without 
a worldview, who attempts to rid themselves all of their commitments and be a tabula rasa 
willing to be written on only by brute facts that need no interpretation.
85
 Even though this task is 
probably impossible, if someone could do this they would thereby establish a set of conditions 
which would make it impossible to know or understand anything at all. Accordingly, Bahnsen 
says “There are no facts or uses of reason which are available outside of the interpretive system 
of basic commitments or assumptions which appeals to them.”86 Frame also says that  
We have no access to reality apart from our interpretive faculties. To seek such access is 
to seek release from [being human]. We cannot step outside of our own skins…We never 
dig deep enough to reach some “bedrock” of pure facticity–facts undefiled by any 
interpretive activity…It is better to recognize that all statements of fact are interpretations 
of reality and that all true interpretations are factual.
87
  
To use the analogy, if we remove our glasses we will be completely blind, and not merely left 
with some blurry vision. There is nothing there for us to know without using employing a 
worldview because there is no way for us to know except by using a worldview. Thus, we can 
conclude that all of our thinking and reasoning can be considered worldview-reasoning. 
IV.) Evidentialism Rejected 
The implications of this discussion are far reaching. If all of this is true, then there are definite 
conclusions that we can draw about the nature and scope of philosophical inquiry, epistemology 
proper, and epistemology of religion. On the one hand, since neutrality is impossible, philosophy 
should not be understood as dispassionate, discursive truth-finding discipline comprised of 
isolated and discrete areas of inquiry. It is not clear that rational reflection by itself will 
automatically yield unqualified true conclusions or even conclusions that every rational person 
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must agree upon. Likewise, though it is helpful and good to recognize different areas of 
philosophical of philosophical inquiry (e.g., metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, etc.), 
philosophy nevertheless involves a cohesive network of related questions. In this way 
philosophic inquiry will perhaps be best used as a tool for the development and comparison of 
worldviews. By asking philosophical questions one can come to better understand, to adjust, or 
perhaps even to replace their worldview if they should find that it is faulty, inconsistent, or 
unable to account for important data. It will also help us identify inconsistencies and work to iron 
them out, as it were. Similarly, because philosophy helps us look critically at our lenses rather 
than through them, it can help us to develop a vocabulary for explaining and comparing 
worldviews. As one comes to understand their own worldview in this way they will become 
more articulate and able to explain their worldview to someone who differs. This can also help 
us consider something of what it is like to look through someone else’s lenses and to see how, 
based on their presuppositions, they arrive at the conclusions they do. 
Perhaps one of the most important implications of this whole discussion has to do with 
how we engage in philosophical debate. If philosophy could be conducted in a neutral way then 
it would make sense to debate individual questions one at a time without any reference to other 
questions. If, as has been argued, philosophy is relative to worldviews then it does not make as 
much sense to employ this methodology. If Smith and Jones get into a debate over the nature of, 
say, substance and fail to acknowledge the fact that they are operating with different 
presuppositions and from different worldviews, then the whole debate is in jeopardy of being 
undermined. Ignoring this truth does not change the fact that there is no absolute neutrality. It 
only ensures that one will lack the philosophical self-consciousness that comes from 





philosophical discussions. Consider Smith and Jones again. They would both do well to 
acknowledge the basic presuppositions that they are building their systems upon. If they do this 
can they hope to have meaningful philosophical dialogue despite their different starting points. 
Likewise they can begin to understand each other’s systems in a well informed manner that lends 
it the maximum amount of charity. This way they can also make sense of the fact that, though 
both of them are seemingly reasonable people, they nevertheless disagree on so many things, 
understand the world differently, find different arguments convincing, and so on. 
 This last point has particular relevance when it comes to contemporary epistemology of 
religion and the debate over Enlightenment evidentialism. By appealing to these observations, 
the Presuppositionalist can reject Enlightenment evidentialism as irrelevant and misleading. The 
notion of evidence as something that is purely objective and which lends itself to one and only 
one neatly identifiable interpretation is somewhat mistaken. As we saw above, facts and 
evidence need interpretation and are thus meaningfully situated within and understood in terms 
of worldviews. Thus the Enlightenment assertion that religious belief can only be justified if it is 
proportioned to the evidence, while intuitively appealing, can be misleading and very easily 
misapplied. This evidentialist notion appears to be built upon the faulty assumption that there is 
sufficient philosophical neutrality to develop universal, uncontextualized criteria for gathering, 
weighing, and interpreting evidence for religious belief. The problem, however, is that just as 
each worldview comes complete with its own truth criterion so each religion has (or at least can 
have) its own truth criteria and epistemology.
88
 Thus, when an Enlightenment evidentialist 
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requires evidence in order to justify a religious belief, they will almost assuredly be committing a 
sort of informal fallacy. That is, they will be making illegitimate and uninformed demands unless 
they pay very careful attention to the specific truth criteria of the religion in question and only 
require evidence and argumentation that is consistent with these internal criteria. This is because 
the only “evidence” that can ever suffice for a worldview/religion is that which is consistent with 
whatever truth criterion that the worldview/religion presupposes. Recall the observation from 
above that if one sets out to argue for their ultimate truth criteria by appealing to some other 
criteria then they are necessarily confused about what it means to hold to an ultimate truth 
criteria. This is the same sort of problem that comes when we impose foreign, external truth 
criteria to a belief system. 
 The point here is that justification is not a neutral topic. To lay down one theory of 
justification that all religions must adhere to, be it evidentialism or whatever, is to fail to 
understand that religions and worldviews already appeal to and our built upon their own internal 
epistemic criteria. The result of this is that rather than offering one universal criteria, each 
religion must instead be allowed to stand on the basis of its own criteria. Just as ultimate truth 
criteria can only be argued for in a circular manner, so a worldview or religion can only be 
argued for in a way that is consistent with its own presuppositions. It is problematic, then, to 
evaluate a worldview by any criteria other than the ones it was founded on. If Smith’s religion is 
unjustified according to Jones’s evidentialist criteria then this does not tell us anything about 
Smith’s religion, per se, except that Jones disagrees with it based on his own presuppositions. In 
such a scenario we can learn more about Jones and his commitments then about Smith’s 
worldview which he is interacting with (rather, failing to interact with). The only way for Jones 





Accordingly, Cornelius Van Til concludes that a believer in one system must, for the sake of 
argument, step inside their interlocutor’s system and be aware of their presuppositions and vice 
versa. If they do this they can hope to have a meaningful, insightful dialogue despite their 
different starting points. In this way they can begin to understand each others’ systems in a 
reliable way that lends a maximum amount of charity to the systems in question. Thus, what we 
had earlier concluded about philosophical debate in general applies to epistemology of religion 
in the same way: awareness of worldviews helps us make sense of the fact that reasonable people 
may disagree on many things, understand the world differently, find different arguments 
convincing, and so on. 
 Thus the Presuppositionalist rejects Enlightenment evidentialism in a highly nuanced way 
when compared to the first three responses we considered (i.e., Natural Theology, 
Wittgensteinian Fideism, and Reformed Epistemology). We treated these three responses as a 
straightforward rejection of either premise (1), that belief in God is the sort of belief that requires 
evidence, or as a rejection of premise (2), that there is insufficient evidence for belief in God. 
The Presuppositionalist rejection, however, cannot be neatly categorized in this way. This 
position has important things to say about both premises but does not build its position around a 
straightforward rejection of either of them. To clarify this point it will be helpful to see how the 
Presuppositionalist is sympathetic to the first three responses we considered. 
 While the Presuppositionalist would disagree with the Natural Theologian in terms of 
methodology, there are nevertheless some important areas where they are sympathetic that are 
worth pointing out. Above we established that the Natural Theologian and Enlightenment 
evidentialist agree in terms of methodology. That they, they agree that in order for belief in God 





evidence. We have just seen how the Presuppositionalist rejects this Enlightenment position 
because there is no neutrality when it comes to evaluating evidence and also because each 
worldview comes complete with its own justificational and epistemic criteria. In taking this 
stance, however, the presuppositionalist has not said anything about what the evidence and data 
point towards. In a strange sense the Presuppositionalist, being a Christian, will agree with the 
Natural Theologian that there is sufficient evidence for believing in God. While they do not 
advocate that this is the source of justification for belief in God, they nevertheless agree with the 
Natural Theologian that the correct assessment and interpretation of all the evidence will of 
course point to belief in God as being reasonable. The Presuppositionalist can thus stand in an 
intermediate position and give a reason for why the Natural Theologian and the Enlightenment 
evidentialist disagree. They disagree over what the evidence itself means and why it is or is not 
convincing because there are different worldviews at play. Every discrete piece of evidence and 
every argument will be handled differently and situated within a different wider constellation of 
beliefs.  
Again, the Presuppositionalist denies that there is neutrality when it comes to the 
gathering, definition, and interpretation of evidence and data. However, they do not go so far as 
to say that worldviews are never grounded in data or experience. There may be some conceivable 
worldview or religious systems that are fideistic or for some internal reasons do not care about 
grounding their beliefs in experience, but this is not contradict the point. Some worldviews, 
probably most worldviews, do make use of evidence in some capacity or other. They may or may 
not choose to argue for what they believe based on evidence. However, since worldviews are 
interpretive systems or frameworks they will most often provide their user with a set of criteria 





to have some explanatory force; they typically allow their user engage all sorts of information 
and make sense of our common experiences in the world. Worldviews are, after all, interpretive 
lenses that we use to make sense of our lives. Thus the way that evidence relates to worldview is 
not as the Enlightenment evidentialists and Natural Theologians suggest. Evidence, as has been 
explained, is something that subject to worldviews. Thus evidential claims cannot be used in the 
straightforward Evidentialist sense for inter-worldview debates. Rather, interpretations of 
evidence may be used if one wished to demonstrate that their worldview has explanatory force or 
makes sense of our experience. Thus, by giving evidences for the truth of one’s worldview, one 
is not able to set it up as true and other as false. Rather, one is merely able to suggest that there is 
viable. Only if it were possible to show that a worldview were not viable, perhaps that it has 
some radical inconsistencies, could it then be rejected. Even this, however, is not on the bases of 
discrete evidence in and of itself but instead on the basis of an internal problem. 
There is a thesis behind all of this that it is important to bring forward. In bringing this 
thesis to light we shall compare the Presuppositional response to evidentialism with 
Wittgensteinian Fideism. As we mentioned above Wittgensteinian Fideism was formed as a 
denial of premise (1), that belief in God requires evidence if it is to justifiably believed. We also 
saw that this position was built upon both an autonomy thesis and a certain version of an 
incommensurability thesis. At this point the similarities between the Presuppositionalists and 
Wittgensteinian Fideists are apparent but the ways in which they differ need to be highlighted. 
First, they are similar in that both recognize that belief systems have their own internal methods 
of justification. One way they differ, however, is in their understanding of incommensurability.
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Both, I would say, hold to some version of incommensurability, but the Wittgensteinian Fideists 
have a much more stringent position than the Presuppositionalists. 
For the Wittgensteinian Fideists the incommensurability thesis primarily involves their 
criteria of meaning. As we saw above, meaning for them was relative to language games and 
religious belief systems gives rise to language games that are logically isolated from 
metaphysical, scientific, and historical language games. On this basis they understand religious 
language to be expressive of a form of life rather than descriptive of reality. As we mentioned in 
passing, this sort of view is not acceptable to religious conservatives because they maintain that 
their religious and theological utterances are aimed at describing reality in exactly the same way 
that the scientist’s or metaphysician’s language is understood to be aimed at describing reality. 
The Presuppositionalist number among these sorts of religious realists who maintain that their 
language is meant to describe reality in just the same way as these other sorts of language is. 
Thus the presuppositionalist denies the Wittgensteinian Fideists’ version of the 
incommensurability thesis. In their denial of this, however, they still maintain a softer sort of 
incommensurability. 
 The Presuppositionalist denies that religious language is logically isolated and cut off 
from other areas of inquiry. Nevertheless they do maintain that there is some incommensurability 
on some levels. Rather than religious language being incommensurable with scientific, historical, 
and metaphysical language, they maintain that there is some incommensurability between 
worldview themselves. However, there is not a complete and rigid incommensurability whereby 
people with different worldviews are completely isolated from each other. Rather, there is 
enough in common for there to be effective communication between people with different 





meet. Provided that they speak the same language they can communicate effectively on whole 
range of topics. The incommensurability of their worldviews only really begins to shows itself 
when their conversation turns to more detailed philosophical or worldview-related questions. At 
this point they will begin to disagree over a number of topics, provided that they actually know 
and believe enough of the view that they profess. 
 This sort of incommensurability thesis further explains the ways in which the 
Presuppositionalist both agrees and disagrees with the Natural Theologian. According to this sort 
of an incommensurability thesis, what is incommensurable is not different language games per se 
but rather worldviews as whole units. They are incommensurable in that they are not directly 
comparable in terms of evidence. As we saw above, it is impossible, by mere appeals to 
evidence, to say that one worldview is superior to another. Again, this is because each viable 
worldview will be able to make sense of the same data and interpret it differently. Or based on 
internal reasons, it may not have a need to deal with the issue at all. Thus, we cannot appeal 
directly to evidence in order to show that one worldview is better than another. The closest we 
could come to this is to point out that a given worldview fails to give an account for something 
that it attempts to give an account for. This, however, would not be an example of 




 Despite this sort of incommensurability I am not suggesting that worldviews are in no 
way comparable. As mentioned studying philosophy can help one elucidate and make explicit 
their worldview. Likewise, by engaging in philosophical discussion we can compare worldviews 
and see how and why they provide different answers to the fundamental worldview questions 
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outlined above. This is quite different from the Wittgensteinian Fidesits who seem be suggesting 
a much more radical incommensurability and incomparably of different worldviews. They paint 
religion as an isolated and closed circle. On my view, however, worldviews and religious are 
comparable and communication between them and about them is possible even if they are, in the 
end, incommensurable in terms of mere evidence.
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 Lastly, we can identify some ways in which the presuppositionalist is very sympathetic to 
the Reformed Epistemologist. As is clear by now, these schools reject enlightenment 
evidentialism for slightly different reasons. The Reformed Epistemologist does so by offering 
differing criteria for proper basicality. The Presuppositionalist, however, argues on the basis of 
worldviews. Nevertheless, they stand in full agreement with the Reformed Epistemologist when 
they say that belief in God does not necessarily require propositional evidence. The reason that 
the Presuppositionalists believe this, however, is usually tied more directly and explicitly to their 
theology.
92
 Since the Presuppositionalists argue that criteria for justifying beliefs are internal to 
worldviews, they look directly to the Bible for the criteria and justification for belief in God. 
While we cannot investigate their theological arguments and exegesis of Scripture, the 
Presuppositionalists arrive at a conclusion almost identical to that of the Reformed 
Epistemologists: belief in God properly basic. In fact, they go so far as to say that every human 
being, by virtue of their construction and design as God’s image bearers, inescapably has 
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immediate knowledge of God which they either acknowledge or suppress. On this basis, one is 
fully justified to believe in God without argumentation. In fact, some Presuppositionalists would 
say that because we are designed to know God immediately, that demanding proof for his 
existence is imprudent. 
 Notice here that the Presuppositionalist has the freedom to turn directly to internal 
reasons for defending the reasonableness of belief in God. The Reformed Epistemologist does 
not quite have this luxury. Instead, they are committed, for better or worse, to defending the idea 
that belief in God is properly basic without recourse to theological evidence. Thus, things like 
God’s nature or character cannot be used to discuss the reasonableness of believing in him as 
properly basic. Nor can they appeal to the theological character of human beings. The 
presuppositionalist would be unwilling, because of their theological commitments, to argue in 
such a way. Thus, the Reformed Epistemologist has a seemingly daunting task of defending he 
basicality of belief in God without specifically challenging the presuppositions that others are 
brining to the discussion. They allow their interlocutors to continue using their own 
presuppositions and do not ask them to recognize and suspend judgment for the sake of 
argument. The Presuppositionalist then agrees with the conclusion that the Reformed 
Epistemologist arrives at while simultaneously disagreeing the exact method used to arrive that 
this conclusion.  
Tentative Conclusions 
From all of this we can draw several tentative conclusions regarding epistemology of religion 
and the justification of religious belief. First, and more generally, we can conclude that a large 
part of epistemology of religion should be conducted on the worldview-level or on the 





mind that presuppositions play a crucial role and they should not be ignored. Thus we should not 
carelessly assert some normative, universal criteria for measuring the justification of belief and 
assume that they will apply in all circumstances and to all belief systems. This is sort of project 
will most surely fail to take into account the fact that each worldview operates with its own 
epistemological criteria and theories of justification. Such an approach may thus end up labeling 
some beliefs as irrational or unjustified without taking into consideration the actual reasons that 
one might believe them. Rather than carrying on this like, an epistemologist of religion should 
always be careful to identify presuppositions and worldview-commitments; fist their own and 
then others’. For this reason, whenever an individual religious belief is being considered, its 
justification must ultimately be understood as relative to the belief system of the believer.  
A second conclusion that we can draw from this discussion regards Enlightenment 
evidentialism. Since this view fails to recognize these sorts of concerns, we can conclude that its 
rejection of belief in God is misguided and thus has no teeth, as the saying goes. That is, while 
the evidentialist thinks that there is insufficient evidence for belief in God, they fail to engage 
with theists on a presuppositional level. Thus, while some theists, Presuppositionalists for 
example, have internal reasons for believing in God without propositional evidence, this 
methodology is presumed to be faulty by the Enlightenment evidentialist before any debate can 
occur. In this way they impose their own criteria for justification on other systems in a way that 
wrongly falsify them. To put this all into general terms, worldviews should not be dismissed or 
dispelled without concern for their content, internal justification, and epistemic criteria. It seems 
as one of the only ways that we can legitimately reject a worldview is if it somehow fails to meet 






Objections and Responses 
Coherentism 
Before closing there are some potential problems and objections that should to be addressed. The 
first and perhaps most pressing objection is that presuppositionalism as I have outlined is just 
another form of Coherentism. Coherentism is a theory of justification that can be understood as a 
solution to what has been referred to as the “epistemic regress problem”. Briefly, this problem 
starts with recognition of the fact that the justification of a given belief often depends upon the 
justification of other beliefs. That is, when justifying our beliefs we very often refer to other 
beliefs in the course of justifying the one in question. If we carry on like this we will discover a 
sort of justificatory chain whereby one belief is justified by another and that by another and so on 
and so forth. The problem that this raises is how does justification come about in the final 
analysis? Where and how might such a chain end if we where to keep following it? There are 
several potential answers. It could be that the chain extends infinitely, that it ends that some 
point, or that it is circular and loops back over itself. The first solution is dismissed as unhelpful 
for obvious reasons. The second solution is roughly “foundationalism” as we outlined above. 
The third potential solution is, roughly, “coherentism”. 
Coherentism, then, is a theory of justification that depends upon epistemic circularity. 
One of the problems that coherentists face is that if mere coherence is sufficient for justification 
then it seems possible to arrive at multiple coherent systems that represent the world quite 
differently. Presuppositionalists face the same problem. In fact, the theory of worldviews outline 
above seems suspiciously similar to coherentism. On this basis one might object that all I have 
offered is a different version of coherentism. This objection, however, misses the mark. As 





enlightenment evidentialism, but rather bringing up some relevant metaphilosophical concerns.
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Thus, calling Presuppositionalism a form of coherentism is something of a category error. 
I have been arguing that we do in fact make use of worldviews and that this is relevant 
for rejecting Enlightenment evidentialism. I have not been arguing for the epistemic thesis that 
justification is always and only a matter of coherence. Rather, as mentioned above, each 
worldview has its own criteria for justification. To be sure, some worldviews may incorporate a 
coherentist epistemology. Others, however, may incorporate some form of foundationalism (this 
is exactly what the Reformed Epistemologist sets out to do for Christianity), or any other theory 
of knowledge. Coherence certainly plays a role in the theory of as worldviews outlined above, 
but it does not play the same role that it does for the coherentist: being a universal source of 
justification. Rather, what it means for a worldview to be coherent is, partly, that its conclusions 
and constitutive beliefs cohere with whatever epistemology and truth criteria it incorporates. 
Thus, while I certainly make much of coherence, I would not argue along with a coherentist that 
coherence alone is sufficient for justification. Instead, I would assert that an incoherent 
worldview is problematic and that it needs either to be reworked or rejected. Thus I see 
coherence as necessary for the viability of a worldview but not as the only necessary and 
sufficient condition for justification. Again, justification is a condition of whatever theory of 
knowledge a given worldview incorporates. 
Circularity 
A second objection is the charge that the Presuppositionalist is advocating for a kind of 
circularity and thus their position should be dismissed. The Presuppositionalist certainly does 
advocate for some kind of circularity but it is not clear that their position should be dismissed as 
a result. To illustrate the kind of circularity that the Presuppositionalist admits consider their 
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method for justifying belief in God. If asked why they believe in God, or why it is rational for 
them to believe in God, the Presuppositionalist will only offer evidence and reasons deemed 
appropriate by scripture. They will thus employ a biblical epistemology when arguing for the 
existence of God. However, at this very point they are engaging in a kind of circular reasoning. 
However, this is not a vicious circle (e.g., “The Bible is true; therefore the bible is true”), but 
rather a kind of broad circularity.
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 It is not a fallacious circle but a kind of circularity that seems 
to be unavoidable. 
 Pointing out this sort of circularity does not constitute a good reason for rejecting 
everything that the Presuppositionalist has to say. To be sure, one will most likely not be 
convinced on the basis of such a narrow argument that they should believe in God. Nevertheless, 
what the Presuppositionalist is doing when they argue in this way is demonstrative of how all 
presuppositions and worldviews must be argued for. No presupposition and no worldview can be 
argued for in a non-circular way. As outlined above, to argue for such a belief or commitment by 
any other criteria would simply betray a commitment to these other criteria. Thus the 
Presuppositionalist allows for this kind of circular reasoning because they take it be ultimately 
unavoidable. To allow for this kind of circularity, however, is not to condone the use of 
fallacious question begging tactics. Rather, this position simply recognizes that for human beings 
all of our reasoning must be circular because we employ worldviews that either explicitly or 
implicitly guide our thinking and interpretation of the world around us. 
Fideism 
Another objection that could be made is that this position is ultimately fideistic. However, this 
claim is certainly a misunderstanding. There are two ways of defining fideism and it is easy to 
demonstrate that a Presuppositionalist is not advocating either one. First, fideism could mean 
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believing without positive reasons for believing. This is not what the Presuppositionalist is 
advocating. It is true that some conceivable worldviews might perhaps operate on such fideistic 
terms and the Presuppositionalist would have to allow them to do so. However, even with such a 
worldview we would expect some internal reasons for why they operate in such a way. 
Furthermore, simply denying the evidentialist claim that belief in God requires evidence does not 
suffice for this kind of fideism. As we saw, the Presuppositionalist denies this proposition not 
because evidence is in itself undesirable but rather because such a requirement is easily 
misleading and apparently involves the mistaken assumption that there is sufficient neutrality 
when it comes to gathering, weighing, and interpreting evidence. Thus the Presuppositionalist is 
not fideistic in these terms. Likewise, as mentioned in the section on circularity, the 
Presuppositionalist would give evidence and reasons for their belief provided that they are 
understood and interpreted according to biblical presuppositions. Rather than being fideistic in 
this way, the Presuppositionalist simply wants to leave room for people within different 
worldviews to define on their own terms what counts as evidence and what counts as good 
reason for believing a given thing.  
 A second sort of fideism, which is much more radical, is the notion that one may believe 
something despite counter evidence. Again, this is not what the Presuppositionalist is setting out 
to defend. It may seem that the Presuppositionalists take this position, or at least allow for this 
position, because they can allow for different and contrary interpretations of the same data set by 
people with different worldviews. However, this is different from saying that one believes 
something in spite of evidence to the contrary. The issue that is at play here is what exactly 
would suffice as counter evidence. If two people with different worldviews disagree about how 





not to say that one of them must necessarily entertain their beliefs in spite of counter evidence. A 
trans-worldview disagreement of data interpretation does not suffice as counter evidence in the 
relevant, fideistic sense. Rather, what would suffice as counter evidence for a worldview is when 
it can be demonstrated that the worldview fails to account for something that it is expected to or 
attempts to give an account for. Thus the Presuppositionalist is not advocating a brand of fideism 
whereby religious believers may entertain unjustified contradictions. 
Normative Epistemic Truth Claims 
A fourth problem for the Presuppositionalist has to do with making normative epistemic claims. 
One of the conclusions that we drew earlier was that worldviews should not be dismissed out of 
hand and without concern for their content, internal justification, and epistemic criteria. This 
constitutes something of a normative epistemic or methodological claim. The potential problem 
here is that if epistemology is something that is relative to worldviews, then how is it possible to 
make such normative claims? Furthermore, is it possible to conceive of some worldview which 
uses internal reasons to legitimize critiquing other worldviews in a way that disregards these 
normative standards? At this point, unfortunately, I am unable to formulate a satisfactory or very 
well thought out response. However, I can suggest two potential lines of defense. First, one could 
move in the direction of an ad hominem attack and suggest that someone who will ignore this 
normative methodological claim will only prove to be closed-minded. That is, if someone argues 
on the basis of their own worldview that another’s worldview is false or problematic, they are 
not saying anything richly informative or meaningful. Rather they are something like a child 
stopping their ears and screaming until they get their way. 
Another potential line of defense could be to reference some sort of common ground in a 





area of inquiry in which adherents of different worldviews can, for the most part, successfully 
interact. The idea of there being no absolute neutrality (i.e., the myth of neutrality) does not 
necessarily conflict with the idea of their being some sorts limited of common ground. For 
instance, it is possible for people who have different worldviews, upon sufficient reflection, to 
recognize the existence of different worldviews. This awareness of different worldviews is 
significant and perhaps constitutes a sort of common ground. If there is this sort of common 
ground then perhaps it is possible to make the sort of normative claim we are interested in: that it 
is methodologically unsound to dismiss a worldview without recourse to its internal content and 
structure. However, both of these lines of defense will need to be further worked out in another 
paper. 
Subjectivism or Skepticism 
One last potential problem for this position is the charge it ultimately sets up some sort of 
subjectivism or skepticism. That is, if worldviews rely only upon internal reasons for the 
justification of belief, then what is to prevent any number of conceivable worldviews from being 
valid or viable? Furthermore, and more pressing, how can anyone know in the final analysis 
whether or not their worldview is in fact the correct one to hold? Internal reasons cannot confirm 
that the worldview actually maps onto or corresponds to reality. After all, every viable 
worldview will purport to explain reality and thus will see itself as truly descriptive of the way 
that things are. Thus there is a need for something external to worldviews to ground them if there 
is be certainty that one’s worldview is the correct one. However, if it is true that there is no such 





the final analysis the Presuppositionalist has theological reasons to not worry so much about this 
threat of subjectivism or skepticism.
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Nevertheless, some Presuppositional thinkers have been working on developing a 
transcendental argument which aimed at demonstrating that their position is true (i.e., does 
accurately capture reality). By a transcendental argument is meant a kind of argument which 
aims at establishing some premise as logically primitive. By logically primate I mean something 
that is argued from and not to. For instance, the law of non-contradiction is held onto in what 
might be classified as a transcendental way. It is logically primitive and must argued from and 
not to. That is, this law is presupposed in our reasoning. One cannot even begin argue against it 
without presupposing it. Thus, it is an underlying condition that makes argumentation possible. 
In an analogous way some Presuppositionalists, lead by Cornelius Van Til, have worked on 
establishing a transcendental argument for God. If they succeed they would in effect be showing 
that the existence of the God of the bible is, like the law of non-contradiction, an underlying 
condition that makes true and false predication possible.
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 However, this argument, in its current 
stage of development, needs a lot of work and is far from satisfactory. 
Closing Remarks 
In this paper we have undertaken to outline the main contours of the contemporary epistemology 
of religion. We have understood this as a debate over whether or not evidentialism applies to the 
belief component of religion or not. First we considered Enlightenment evidentialism and its 
rejection of belief in God. Next we surveyed several mainstream responses including Natural 
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 That is, based on theological reasons internal to their system they do not worry about the charge of subjectivism or 
skepticism. This is because of the sort of epistemology they ultimately argue for which depends upon God’s 




 For a recent essay on this see Don Collet “Van Til and Transcendental Argument, ” in Revelation and Reason, 





Theology, Wittgensteinian Fideism, and Reformed Epistemology. Lastly, we turned to a more 
obscure response that is loosely grounded in the Presuppositional school of Christian 
apologetics. We saw, according to this theory, that philosophy, epistemology, and epistemology 
of religion are all influenced by the fact that we reason on the basis of presuppositions and 
according to a worldview. While there are some areas in which this view, as presented here, 
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